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SUPREME COURT OF MONTANA REFUSES TO DECIDE AVAILABILITY OF
FORUmi NON CONVENIENS IN MONTANA.-Plaintiff, a resident and citizen
of Washington, instituted a suit under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act' in a Montana District court in Silver Bow County. He claimed dam-
ages for injuries sustained in Spokane, Washington, while employed by the
defendant railroad as a switchman in interstate commerce. Defendant
moved to dismiss on the grounds of forum non conveniens, alleging undue
expenses and inconvenience if the trial were to be held at such a distance
from the scene of the accident. The motion was denied and defendant peti-
tioned the Montana Supreme Court for an appropriate writ. An alterna-
tive writ of supervisory control was issued. After a hearing on the return
of the writ, held, writ dissolved and proceedings dismissed. Since only a
few suits of this type have been filed in this jurisdiction by nonresidents,
the adoption of the doctrine of forum non conveniens at this time is not
justified. A substantial increase, however, in this type of litigation would
lead the court to re-examine the doctrine's availability in Montana. State
of Montana, ex rel. Great Northern Railway Company v. District Court, 365
P.2d 512 (Mont. 1961) (Justice Adair concurred in result only, Justice
Doyle concurred specially, and Justice Castles dissented).
The California Supreme Court has described the doctrine of forum non
conveniens in these words:
The rule of forum non conveniens is an equitable one embracing
the discretionary power of a court to decline to exercise the juris-
diction it has over a transitory cause of action when it believes that
the action before it may be more appropriately and justly tried
elsewhere.
It is now settled that the doctrine is available in federal courts in Fed-
eral Employers' Liability Act (hereinafter FELA) cases.' It is also well
settled that a state is free to decide the applicability of the principle in the
state courts according to its own local law.' The Montana court was aware
of these principles.
Justice Adair, concurring in result only," contended that forum nn
conveniens is not available in Montana FELA cases. Justice Adair pro-
posed several reasons for his position, only two of which will be noted here.
First, he argued that a dismissal under the doctrine would be a deprivation
of plaintiff's right to sue in any forum in which the defendant does busi-
ness, a right conferred upon him by the federal statute." The United States
Supreme Court seems to have conclusively answered this proposition by
saying:'
145 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1958).
'Leet v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 25 Cal. 2d 605, 609, 155 P.2d 42, 44 (1944).
'En parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55 (1949).
'Missouri ex rel. Southern Ry. Co. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1 (1950).
6Instant case at 514.
6Instant case at 514.71nstant case at 521.
8Douglas v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 279 U.S. 377, 387 (1929).
1
Anderson: State of Montana ex re. Great Northern Railway Company v. District Court
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1961
RECENT DECISIONS
As to the grant of jurisdiction in the Employers' Liability Act,
that statute does not purport to require State Courts to entertain
suits arising under it, but only to empower them to do so, so far as
the authority of the United States is concerned.
Second, Justice Adair contended that the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens was not a part of the common law at the time that law was adopted
by Montana.' Inasmuch as no Montana statutes expressly authorize the
use of the doctrine, he contended that there is no basis for the existence of
the doctrine in Montana.'
The principle, however, is not new. The New York courts, as long
ago as 1868." recognized that though a court might have jurisdiction, yet
it could, in a proper instance, refuse to entertain that jurisdiction.'
The principle of forum non conveniens has been held to be within the
inherent power of a court.' In Universal Adjustment Corporation v. Mid-
land Bank," the Massachusetts court noted that:'
[C] ourts of general jurisdiction have "inherent power to do what-
ever may be done under the general principles of jurisprudence
to insure" to parties to litigation a fair trial .... This statement
comprehends within its broad scope the power to determine the
question whether the doctrine of forum non conveniens ought to
be applied in any particular case.
One California court, recognizing that courts possess inherent powers
and that those powers are not dependent upon constitutional grants, has
stated that such powers may be used by the courts "to properly and ef-
fectively functions as a separate department in the scheme of our state
government."' A recent California case, Price v. Atchison," seemed to
view the doctrine as being within the inherent powers of the court, say-
ing:'
[W]e are of the view that the injustices and burdens ... require
that our courts, acting upon equitable principles and within the
Constitutional limits . . . exercise their discretionary power to
decline to proceed in those causes of action which they conclude,
on satisfactory evidence, may be more appropriately and justly
tried elsewhere.
9Instant case at 516.
'Instant case at 519.
'Dewit v. Buchanan, 54 Barb. 31 (N.Y. 1868).
"
2It is not the purpose of this article to attempt a historical analysis of the doctrine
of forum non conveniens. Such an undertaking would require much more space than
is here allotted. Suffice it to say that this writer believes Justice Adair's contention
to be, at the most, highly arguable. The following citations are included as some
indication of the historical development of the doctrine: Logan v. Bank of Scot-
land, 1 K.B. 141 (1906) ; Collard v. Beach, 81 App. Div. 582, 81 N.Y. Supp. 619(1st. Dept. 1903) ; Great Western Ry. Co. v. Miller, 19 Mich. 305 (1869) ; see also
the annotation and cases cited in 32 A.L.R. beginning at page 6.1 Universal Adjustment Corp. v. Midland Bank, 281 Mass. 303, 184 N.E. 152 (1933);
St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Superior Court, 276 P.2d 773, 778 (Okla. 1954).
"281 Mass. 303, 184 N.E. 152 (1933).35Id, 184 N.E. at 159.
"Corum v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 67 Cal. App. 2d 891, 155 P.2d 710, 713 (1945).
"'42 Cal. 2d 577, 268 P.2d 457 (1954).laId., 268 P.2d at 461.
1962]
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Price v. Atchison expressly overruled a prior California decision which
had denied the doctrine's existence in FELA suits.- In the Price case, an
FELA suit involving nonresidents and a tort committed in New Mexico,
the California court explained that since the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Missouri cx rel. Southern Railway Company v. Mayfield,' a
state court was no longer required to deny the existence of the doctrine
in FELA cases."'
The Utah Supreme Court advanced a unique argument for the adoption
of the doctrine in that state." The court noted a state venue statute which
provided, in part, for the change of place of trial within the state "when
the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted by
the change." In referring to this statute, the Utah court stated :"
It would appear from this enactment that the legislature intended
the courts of this state to have the right to refuse jurisdiction in
those instances where a more convenient forum was available with-
in the state. If the principle can be applied against all persons
within the state, there is no good reason why the doctrine should
not be extended to causes of action arising outside the state if it
is applied equally as to all litigants.
The portion of the Utah statute quoted is almost identical to a provi-
sion of one of the Montana venue statutes, section 93-2906 of the Revised
Codes of Montana, 1947.' In the light of this clear legislative recognition
and support of the principle upon which the doctrine is based, i.e., a change
of forum to promote the ends of justice, the Montana court could, without
difficulty, determine that the use of the doctrine of forum non conveniens
is within the inherent power of the courts of this state.
Another consideration, noted by the California court in the Price case,
is that an anomaly is presented where a federal district court may transfer
an FELA suit to a more appropriate forum, while, in comparable actions,
regardless of the equities involved, a state court may not decline jurisdic-
tion. The court said:"
We are persuaded that such a result would be promotive of neither
fairness, justice, nor Congressional intent when removal power
was bestowed upon the federal district courts.
As noted by one law review writer, "the growth of forum non con-
veniens in this country was long hindered by decisions indicating that
'Leet v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 25 Cal. 2d 605, 155 P.2d 42 (1944).
240 U.S. 1 (1950).
mSupra note 17, 268 P.2d at 460.
'Mooney v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., 118 Utah 307, 221 P.2d 628 (1950).
2UTAH CoDEs ANN., 1943, § 104-4-9.
"Mooney v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., 118 Utah 307, 221 P.2d 628, 647 (1950).
'This section provides, in part, as follows:
The court or judge must, on motion, change the place of trial In the following
cases:
"(3) When the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice would be pro-
moted by the change.
9IFrlce v. Atchison, 42 Cal. 2d 577, 268 P.2d 457, 461 (1954).
(Vol. 23,
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state courts were required by the federal Constitution to hear actions be-
tween residents of other states."' (Emphasis added.) The United States
Supreme Court, however, has dismissed the possibility of any violation of
the privileges and immunities clause of the Constitution as concerns state
application of forum non conveniens in FELA cases. In the Mayfield
case, the Supreme Court explained its position in these words:"
By reason of the Privileges-and-Immunities Clause of the Con-
stitution, a State may not discriminate against citizens of sister
States. Art. IV, § 2. Therefore Missouri cannot allow suits by non-
resident Missourians for liability arising out of conduct outside
that State and discriminatorily deny access to its courts to a non-
resident who is a citizen of another State. But if a State chooses
to " [prefer] residents in access to often overcrowded Courts" and
to deny such access to all non-residents, whether its own citizens
or those of other States, it is a choice within its own control.
Following the decision in the Mayfield case, two states have adopted
the doctrine, expressly overruling prior decisions.- Two other states have
accepted the doctrine, evidently as a matter of first impression, relying
upon the Mayfield decision.'
In Montana the status of the doctrine is unclear. In a previous case,
Bracy v. Great Northern Railway Company,' the court refused to decide
whether forum non conveniens was available. The court held merely that
even if the doctrine was available, the trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion by denying the motion to dismiss.'
Whether the trial court in the instant case held that the doctrine is not
available in Montana, or whether it said that the facts did not warrant its
application is not clear from the supreme court's opinion. There is some
language pointing to each conclusion.' Nor is it clear upon what basis the
supreme court reached its decision. The defendant's motion to dismiss on
the ground of forum non conveniens was denied by the trial court and that
denial was affirmed by the supreme court. The bases upon which the
supreme court could have reached this disposition of the case can be enumer-
ated as follows:
' Comment, Forum Non Conveniens, A New Federal Doctrine, 56 YALE L.J. 1234, 1235
(1946-47).
'Missouri ex rel. Southern Ry. Co. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1, 3, 4 (1950).
"Price v. Atchison, 42 Cal. 2d 577, 268 P.2d 457 (1954) ; Johnson v. Chicago, Burling-
ton & Quincy R.R. Co., 243 Minn. 58, 66 N.W.2d 763 (1954).
'Mooney v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., 118 Utah 307, 221 P.2d 628 (1950);
St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Superior Court, 276 P.2d 773 (Okla. 1954). For
discussion by other courts that have adopted the doctrine on various other grounds,
see Running v. Southwest Freight Lines, Inc., 227 Ark. 839, 303 S.W.2d 578 (1957) ;
Whitney v. Madden, 400 Ill. 185, 79 N.E.2d 593 (1948) ; Stewart v. Litchenberg, 148
La. 195, 86 So. 734 (1920) ; Foss v. Richards, 126 Me. 419, 139 Atl. 313 (1929)
Jackson & Sons v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 86 N.H. 341, 168 Atl. 895 (1933)
Gore v. United States Steel Corp., 15 N.J. 301, 104 A.2d 670 (1954); Murnan v.
Wabash Ry. Co., 246 N.Y. 244, 158 N.E. 508 (1927).
'136 Mont. 65, 343 P.2d 848 (1959).
"Id. at 68, 343 P.2d at 850.
"Instant case at 513. It is alleged that "... respondent [i.e., the trial court] con-
sidered the showing made by relator insufficient to warrant a dismisal of the
action." But it is also alleged "that respondent further believes that it has been
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I. Assume the trial court held forum non conveniens is available in
Montana, but that, in the trial court's discretion, the relative incon-
veniences did not warrant granting defendant's motion to dismiss.
Then the possible bases of the supreme court's decision are as follows:
(1) The supreme court affirmed the decision on the same grounds,
i.e., that the doctrine is available but discretionary with the
the trial court, and here the trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion;
(2) The supreme court affirmed the decision on another ground,
i.e., that the doctrine is not available and the motion was prop-
erly denied;
(3) The supreme court affirmed the decision on still another ground,
i.e., that whether the doctrine is available in Montana need not
now be decided because even though it might be available in an
appropriate case, the facts in this case did not so obviously re-
quire the application of forum non conveniens that the trial
court's denial would amount to an abuse of discretion.
II. Assume the trial court held forum non conveniens is not available in
Montana, then the possible bases of the supreme court's decision are
as follows:
(1) The supreme court affirmed the decision on the same grounds,
i.e., that the doctrine is not available in Montana;
(2) The supreme court affirmed the decision on another ground,
i.e., that the doctrine is available but discretionary, and viewing
all the facts in the instant case the trial court would have
abused its discretion, as a matter of law, had the motion to dis-
miss been granted ;
(3) The supreme court affirmed the decision on still another
ground, i.e., that whether the doctrine is available in Montana
need not now be decided, for, if it is available in an appropriate
case, upon the facts here presented a dismissal by the trial court
would have been an abuse of discretion as a matter of law ;'
III. Assume the trial court did not decide whether forum non conveniens
is available in Montana, but held merely that even if it is available,
the relative inconveniences would not warrant granting defendant's
motion in this case, then the possible bases for the supreme court's
decision are as follows:
(1) The supreme court affirmed the decision on the same grounds,
i.e., that the supreme court need not now decide whether it is
available because, as the trial court found, the relative incon-
venience in this case would not warrant the application of the
doctrine even though it might be available in appropriate cases;
"Assume the trial court held that the doctrine is not available in Montana. If the
supreme court intended to affirm the trial court on the ground of no abuse of
discretion, then the supreme court, may have been in error for the trial court had,
in fact, exercised no discretion. In such an instance, the case should have been
sent back for an exercise of discretion by the trial court.
'See note 34 supra.
[Vol. 23,
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(2) The supreme court affirmed the decision on another ground,
i.e., that the doctrine is not available and the motion was, for
that reason alone, properly denied;
(3) The supreme court affirmed the decision on still another ground,
i.e., that the doctrine is available but the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by denying the motion.
Just which approach the supreme court took in the instant case is not
clear; but there are nine logical possibilities-each of which has some sup-
port in the language of the court.' The court in the instant case cited
Bracy v. Great Northern Railway Company, indicating that "whether the
doctrine should be applied in a given case was a question resting in the
discretion of trial court.' '7  The import of this language, standing alone,
is that the doctrine is available. However, the court concluded by saying:
It we (1o not feel justified in this instance to establish the rule.'' =  Thus,
the court seems to have ruled that the doctrine is not available in Montana.
Whichever position the court took, it did discuss the purposes of the
doctrine and the conditions under which it might apply.' Apparently,
however, the court misunderstood these purposes, for in discussing them,
the court seems to have unduly limited the doctrine. As noted by the
court :'
The purpose of the rule is to require litigants to avail themselves
of the trial forum of their residence and not burden the taxpayers
and courts of foreign jurisdictions with such causes.
In contrast to this statement which limits the purposes of the doctrine,
the United States Supreme Court, in Gulf Oil Corporation v. Gilbert,
noted :
Important considerations are the relative ease of access to sources
of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of un-
willing, and the cost of obtaining attendance of the willing, wit-
nesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate
to the action; and all other practical problems that make trial of a
case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive.
Not only has the Montana court again avoided the issue of forum non
convenieim, but it has compounded the confusion. The court has not made
clear whether or not the doctrine is available in Montana. Further, the
court has not made clear upon which of many possible grounds it based its
decision in the instant case.
'Actually there are eleven possibilities, but two of them would assume that the
sulpreme court was in error. See inotes :14 and 35 stipra.3 7Instmt case at 514.
'lostant case at 514.
"lbistant case at 514. The court seemed to feel that reciprocity was one condition to
he noted in determining whether or not to apply the doctrine. The court noted:
"Siice our sister state has not seen fit to adopt the rule . . . we do not feel justi-
fied in this instance to establish the rule." It is submitted that such a condition is
of little or no significance to such a deternination.
'"Instant case at 514.
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It is submitted that the instant case leaves the law completely unsettled
and furnishes no guide for district judges, litigants, and attorneys. A
definitive, authoritative ruling must some day be made. When an appro-
priate case again arises, the court should have no trouble in determining
that the application of the doctrine is within the inherent power of the
court.
ROBERT G. ANDERSON
DISCRETIONARY DECISION OF A STATE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY WILL
BE SUSTAINED IF BASED ON SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
Baker Sales Barn, Inc. applied to the Montana Livestock Commission
for a "certificate of public convenience and necessity" authorizing the
licensing of a livestock market at Baker, Montana, under the appropriate
Montana statutes. After a hearing the commission denied the application,
concluding that the applicant failed to show the requisite public conveni-
ence and necessity. On appeal the district court set aside the commission's
denial and ordered the certificate to issue. The court reviewed the evidence
presented to the commission and found that the commission had acted
capriciously and arbitrarily and had abused its discretion. On appeal to
the Montana Supreme Court, held, reversed. Under the Montana statute
permitting an appeal from a decision of the Montana Livestock Commission,
the courts will not interfere with the commission's factual determination,
if based on substantial evidence.' Baker Sales Barn, Inc. v. Montana Live-
stock Commission, 367 P.2d 775 (Mont. 1962) (Justice Doyle specially
concurring, and Justices John C. Harrison and Adair writing separate
dissenting opinions).
The instant decision recognizes what is commonly referred to as the
"substantial evidence" rule for determining the evidentiary validity of an
administrative decision.' The rule first appeared in a 1912 decision by
'The Montana statute permitting an appeal from a decision of the Montana Live-
stock Commission is § 46-917 of the REvS-r CODES OF MONTANA, 1947. This section
provides in part: ". . The trial shall Ie held summarily before the district court
upon the record of the evidence presented to the commission of which a complete
record must be kept of the hearings of the commission as shown by said transcript
and the exhibits, if any, presented to the commission and . . . upon which its de-
cision was rendered and there shall not be any additional evidence introduced or
anything in the nature of a trial de novo. The court shall not substitute its discre-
tion for that of the commission but shall determine whether the commission and
whether it acted according to law."
The district court held this statute unconstitutional because it did not provide
for a trial de novo. The supreme court declared, "[The district court] did not need
to go into any constitutional question [because it could have decided the case on
other grounds] and under the familiar rule announced many times we shall not go
into constitutional matters unless it is considered necessary to a decision on the
merits." Instant case at 779. The supreme court, however, after reversing the
district court's decision on the merits failed to answer the respondent's original
contention that the appeal statute is unconstitutional. It can be assumed that, by
finding against the respondent, the supreme court impliedly answered the question
in the negative, i.e., the statute is not unconstitutional.
'In interpreting the appeal statute, the court said, "The statutes confer, whether
wisely or unwisely, the original discretion. in the Commission. Such Commission
is made up, presumptively at least, of men of experience in the field regulated, and
when their discretion is exercised based upon substantial evidence, as it was here,
that discretion should not be interfered with by the courts." Instant case at 782.
[Vol. 23,
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